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Kenneth J. Gergen

Textual Considerations in the
Scientific Construction of Human Character
Molding character from the culture's repositories of discourse is a precarious undertaking. For accounts of character- what it is to be a coherent and
identifiable person- are first of all possessions of the populace. They are central
constituents of the ordinary language conventions and, as a result, intimately
intertwined in daily patterns of human relationship. Thus, when people speak
of their intentions, beliefs, wants, hopes, fears, and the like, they are not only
generating and solidifying agreements concerning the ontology of personal
being, they are also carrying out patterns of relationship in which such terms
are essential integers. (The utterance "I adore you" not only asserts a certain
condition- adoration- to be a central essence of human beings, but simultaneously participates in a form of relatedness that equally determines what it
is to be human.) The writer's position is thus precarious in two senses: first
with respect to his/her symbiotic relationship with the existing language communities and second with respect to the life forms that such writing may either
disturb or destroy.1

It is the first of these conditions that is central to the major arguments
of the present paper. The inscription of character is critical not only for novelists, biographers, and autobiographers; it is also of pivotal importance to
historians, political scientists, legal theorists, philosophers of knowledge, psychologists, and many others. All are challenged with the problem of rendering
in words a sense of recognition- mutuality yet difference. At the same time,
in all these cases the writer is faced with a subtle but consequential problem:
he or she must rely on the discursive forestructure supplied by the culture and
yet perishes by its repetition. In this sense, the literary creation of personhood
is inevitably intertextual (or more precisely, interdiscursive); the writer must
rely on the existing argots of understanding or else ceases to be intelligible. To
write of someone who "feels pickle" or who "wishes in the horizontal" fails
in the cooperative achievement of making sense. At the same time, to reproduce the existing forestructure is to fail in generating moments of distinction
in the ongoing hurly-burly of daily activity. If the writer does not estrange the

audience from the commonplace, he or she can make no claim to voice. At
worst, the writer simply expands the domain of tedium.
My particular concern in this paper is with the way in which literary

considerations enter into the construction of human character in scientific

psychology. How is it that the professional psychologist, as a writer, navigates
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within the psychological literature simultane
of such accounts and serves as a means for
alized discourses.

The present attempt is not to assay the full range of rhetorical techniques
in current use. Rather, more modestly I shall outline three sources of constraint
in the writings of professional psychology and the way in which these constraints enter into the fashioning of character. I will direct attention first to
issues deriving from the psychologist's membership in the culture at large, then
to problems emerging within the scientific subculture, and finally to the textual
requirements of laboratory practice. To echo the initial refrain, my special
concern in each case is with the psychologist's attempt, within current confines
of scientific discourse, to equilibrate between the opposing necessities of conventionality and originality.

Creating Character in Cultural Context

The psychologist's ultimate challenge is to present a compellin
of human functioning to an audience whose lifelong effort has be
functioning humanly. For the most part, people are relatively sec
"knowledge of personal character" and will cite their everyday ade
proof of their discernment. Of course, professional psychologists
members of the culture at large, and as a result they share in the
conceptions of personhood. It is indeed just this background which
them ultimately to meet the challenge of intelligibility. In the sam
seventeenth-century vicar Robert Burton could turn commonsens
melancholy into a 500-page treatise on the causes and cures of this
psychologists of today enter the laboratory already committed to
that persons possess rational thought, emotion, memory, and the
culture's ontology of personhood is seldom brought into question,
the psychologist's accounts are typically congenial to the surroundi

It is in this context that one is sensitized to the subtle shifts in the

sional construction of the person occurring over the past century
tried to describe elsewhere, nineteenth-century romanticism revi
refashioned the medieval "reality of the deep interior." That is, t
musical, architectural, and artistic ventures of the time conspired to
person in terms of a deep energie force, often equated with soul a
in both the spiritual and natural world. It was the expressions
interior, whether in terms of inspiration, devotion, grief, or mora

ment, that gave personal being its significance. These supposit

course, reflected in the character of major protagonists of roman
And in psychology, it is this cultural context that served both to st
to render intelligible Freud's theory of the unconscious. Without
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Character in the Context of Scientific Culture

Social scientists are not only members of the culture at large, but
particular guilds or "interpretive communities" within the general mi
These communities possess histories of textual formulation, internal unde

standings of the nature of human character. And to the extent that the scientis

is to be intelligible, he or she must construct character within the constra
of these traditions. There are a number of stories to be told about such c
straints and their violation. However, there is one of special relevance to w
many take to be the breakdown of the empiricist tradition in recent decad
along with the associated deterioration of boundaries between science and
(fact and fiction, reality and myth, the literal and the metaphoric). It is ag

a story of equilibrating between convention and counterconvention in

construction of character. Its special interest lies in the irony of outcome.
in the very attempt to transcend the consensus view, psychologists have
ceeded in subverting the foundational view of empiricist scientists. In ge
ating "pleasures of the text," they have undermined the very warrant of
text as objective.
To begin the tale, scientific psychologists have shared with the scienti
community at large a particular view of the character of the scientist. T
view, largely constructed within logical empiricist philosophy, paints a her
picture of the scientist. In dramatic terms, the scientist is one whose skill
observation and reason enable him (as feminist critics point out, the role
traditionally gendered) to step outside the vagaries of common opinion an
political prejudice, to press beyond the frontiers of the unknown, and to f
truth from the lands of mystery. (The similarity between this vision of
scientist-hero and Campbell's account of the heroic monomyth is hardly
cidental.) In effect, by virtue of their training in the sciences, professio
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psychologists enter the research arena with a vi
this intelligibility places significant constraints
can be made of the human being within the res
Given the close association between the emp
entific character and twentieth-century moder
regarding the centrality of learning and cognit
Scientific psychology could not, in this sense,
human functioning because such a view is contr
scientist. For the hero-scientist to prove throu
people's rationality and perceptions are govern
forces is to undo the very image that sustains
virtually incumbent upon scientific psychologi
of human functioning that celebrated reason a
personality psychologist George Kelly nicely il
monize the scientist's picture of himself with h
more generally. In one passage of A Theory of P
replace the romantic view of the deeply driven b
of personal cognition:

Let us then . . . have a look at man-the-scientist. . . . W
we are speaking of all mankind and not merely a partic
attained the stature of "scientists." ... It is customary t
aim is to predict and control. This is a summary statem
like to quote in characterizing their own aspirations. Y
rarely credit the human subjects in their experiments w
as though the psychologist were saying to himself, "I, bei
scientist , am performing this experiment in order to im
certain human phenomena; but my subject, being mere
propelled by inexorable drives welling up within him."
were to reopen the question of human motivation and
infer just what it is that sets the course of his endeavor?
in terms of appetites, tissue needs or sex impulses? Or
a massive drift of quite a different sort? Might not th
personal way, assume more of the stature of a scientist,
the course of events with which he is involved? Would

hypotheses, and weigh his experimental evidence? (4-5)

Kelly goes on to build his theory of human functioning on the bas
latter assumption.
Yet, if the social scientist simply feeds back to the scientific co
variations of its own image, he/she will ultimately be rendered invi
oretical characterizations of the person merely recycle "what all good
already know." The central problem for the theorist, then, is that of
ing the common intelligibility of the scientific community while
ously sustaining it. This problem is largely solved through the pro
propositional unpacking described earlier. That is, scientific resear
cated to elucidating one or more of the ancillary propositions, consi
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constitutes the objective environment is determined by the internal operations
of the computerlike individual. Reality within the machine is that which is
allowed or determined by machine configuration. It is in this sense that Anthony Greenwald has characterized the cognitive system as "totalitarian" (63).
That is, it is closed to the influence of other voices, seeking only to sustain its
own position.
Yet, as should be obvious at this point, to the extent that humans are
portrayed as automatonlike computers, top-down in their determination of
"what is the case," the traditional image of the scientist-hero cannot be sustained. For within the newly emerging story scientists no longer search for and
reveal the nature of the unknown; rather, they can only reveal in their writings

the character of their machine operations. They do not record and reflect the
world as it is, but as their own systemic properties require. Thus, in the very

attempt to sustain and elaborate the image of the human being as rational
agent, the traditional concept of rationality- with successful adaptation to ex-

isting circumstances at its cores- is undone. The wholly rational character
proves irrational.
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Human Character in the Laboratory Context

There is a third set of constraints governing the construction of c
in scientific psychology, one that emerges within the context of sy
exploration. Empirical scientists claim warrant for their words largel
basis of methodological procedures. In particular, it is the controlled
ment that enables the "behavior of organisms" (from single cells
societies) to be traced to their causal sources in an objectively rigoro
As commonly proposed, by observing behavior in systematically vary
ditions, the scientist can trace the causal connections between anteced
consequents in a precise and replicable way. In whatever way human c
is constructed within scientific psychology, its contours must be cong
this central, justificatory text.

Indeed, one can trace the various ways in which this forestructu
methodological intelligibility drives the psychologist's portrayals of
nature. Thus, for example, the conception of the experiment is one
"subjects" are exposed to "stimuli," which stimuli operate as "cau
tions." Actions of the subject in experimental conditions are viewed
sponses" caused by the stimuli. For many, the resulting characteriza
the human proves morally problematic because this view of methodol
tually obliterates the discourse of voluntarism. Because "stimulus co
cause responses," the scientist cannot conclude that subjects voluntari
their subsequent actions. A voluntary impulse would essentially oper

uncaused cause and thus fall outside the ontological underpinnin
method. It is in this respect that C. Hampton-Turner has written:

It is not that . . . investigators themselves have a savage eye, but rather that their p
and controlling tools demand the predictable and controllable man in order to co

the Good Experiment. And what a misery the man turns out to be. The highly
Dr. Jekyll discovers Mr. Hyde, the beast in man uncovered by inhuman instrum

In the same vein, Gerd Gigerenzer and David Murray have demonstr
their Cognition as Intuitive Statistics how prevailing concepts of st
logic, inherent features of experimental procedure, ultimately serve a
for theories of human cognition. As they propose, the scientists' st
tools, which "are considered to be indispensable and prestigious, len
selves to transformation into metaphors of mind" (3). Methodology
itself on human character.

Yet, rather than repeating further the rhythm of the preceding sections,

I invite a deviation which allows the present thesis to be laminated in yet
another way. For, as the initial question can be rephrased, how can the scientific
psychologist render an alien language believable? If the science is to make an
original contribution, which entails the novel construction of character, how
is it to be credible in terms of the common idioms through which the world
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of course, each of these translations bears the tr
ever-expanding array of undecidable signification
The introductory section of the research rep

surance that there is indeed an objective datu

theoretical terms refer. Two rhetorical processes
first social corroboration and the second concep
borative function is carried out largely through
reports that claim familiarity with the states in
relevant studies are those carried out in the sam
this location is privileged in its access to the ph
cite only the work of the single laboratory is to
the phenomenon. A multiplicity of additional ci
residual doubt. As the reader is told, for example
of research underscore the influential role of p

actions (A veril, 1973; Lazarus and Folkman, 1

secure is the existence of the phenomenon, acco
search has also succeeded in qualifying or exten
operations. As one learns, for example, "in some
merely the exercise of personal control over the

without curtailing their intensity reduces st

Gnechten, 1978)." Yet, in the end, these many s
inadequate, for in the authors' terms, "The fore
plausible presumptive mediation inferred from t
on direct assessment . . . ." Or in terms of the
other scientists did not really see the myster
merely speculating from their results.7
In addition to garnering social corroboration
nique that has similarly served the cited authors
to the exotic language through conceptual elabor
aphrasings, the authors begin to reduce the opa
At times the paraphrasing moves toward the co
learns, for example, that "Perceived self-efficacy
one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cog
of action needed to meet given situational deman
is given in more or less comprehensible terms h
securing the existence of the phenomenon. If w
it is fortifying to learn that, in fact, X = a pres
suspicious reader might inquire further into th
than the equivalence of the mysterious X. In th
it to "mobilize motivation"? Is this to consum
pep talks, thrust oneself into adrenalin-produci
else?) In other locations in the introductory sect
of the sacred terminology is largely removed from
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borrowing from the plaintalk account, the exotic
real.

The present research study is exceptional in its objectification of the
mental terminology, for it goes on to demonstrate a causal link between the
mental and the material world. Because the material world is commonly accepted as objective within modernist culture and the ontological status of psychological terminologies is suspect, then to demonstrate that psychological
states act on physical states is to solidify the existence of psychological states.
The possibly subjective (and thereby discreditable) becomes objective. This
"causal connection" is established in the present instance by demonstrating
that depending on their perceptions of self-efficacy, a psychological state, subjects are more or less susceptible to a chemical, naloxone, that blocks opiate
(pain-reducing) receptors (a physical state). This account treats perceived selfefficacy as an independent reality, not at this point reducible to work on mathematical tasks.

In the final section of the paper, the "Discussion," the ontological transformation is made complete. For here the commonplace intelligibilities are
virtually forgotten. The reader has previously learned that the alien language
refers to palpable events, reducible to the commonly known. Now that the
linkage is established, it is possible to speak almost wholly within the novel
ontology. The reader is confidently told, for example, that "The results of the
present experiment provide evidence that perceived self-efficacy in coping with
cognitive stressors activates endogenous opioid systems." The reality of the
new ontology is further extended by relating it to other exotic but scientifically

acceptable accounts. And finally, to inject the newly created reality with everyday significance, its implications for personal health are outlined: "A growing body of evidence reveals that the stress of coping inefficacy . . . impairs
cellular components of the immune system." The newly molded character,
replete with perceptions of self-efficacy, is now readied by the laboratory literature to venture forth and cope with cognitive stressors of the world.
To conclude, the scientist no less than the writer of fiction is engaged in
the literary process of rendering human character both interesting and intelligible. By focusing on the character of these problems and the means by which
they are solved within the human sciences, the traditional privilege of mimesis
accorded to the scientist is threatened. If it is to be retained, the distinction
between "factual" and "fictional" accounts of human character must be lodged
in other discursive criteria (e.g., political, ideological, historical). Further, various forms of literary criticism that derive their warrant or justification from
scientific accounts of human character (or quasi-scientific, as in the case of
psychoanalytic theory) thereby lose their justificatory base. For the warrant in
such cases proves to be little more than another form of text. Whether the
present analysis relies as well on unarticulated conceptions of human character
remains open to further assessment.
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Notes

1 For critical assessments of the effects of psychological discourse on cultural life,
see, for example, the work of Edward Sampson, Henderikus Stam, and Julian Henriques
and his colleagues.

2 The present paper thus extends my earlier incursions into the uses of narrative
and metaphor in constructing the identity of persons.

3 For a more extended account of current assumptions of personhood and their
historical origins, see Amelie Rorty's Mind in Action (1988).
4 In this sense one may view the present-day attempt to interpret literature or
other cultural symbols in terms of unconscious process- for example, Kaja Silverman's
The Subject of Semiotics (1983)- as a twentieth-century recapitulation of a nineteenthcentury conception of the person.
5 As Weston and Knapp (93) point out, this view has also been incorporated into
the way in which literary criticism represents the scientist and thus limits, as well, the
way scientific thinking is presented in fictional texts.
6 The previously cited works of White, McClosky, Clifford and Marcus, and Latour
are all consistent with this contention. However, as Paisley Livingston's Literary Knowledge makes clear, the contention is controversial.

7 See also Latour's discussion of the function of citations in creating the sense of
objectivity.
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